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Abstract
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) are raising billions in funding using
multiple strategies, none justified from the point of view of mechanism
design, resulting in severe underpricing and high volatility.
In the present paper, an optimal ICO mechanism is proposed for the first
time: a truthful multi-unit Vickrey-Dutch auction of callable tokens (i.e.,
a new hybrid security of tokens packaged with callable warrants). Truthful
bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy and the auction terminates
with an ex-post efficient allocation; additionally, the callability of the
warrants eliminates the winner’s curse of the auction and its underpricing.
An implementation demonstrates its practical viability.
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1 Introduction
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) have raised $1.5 billion through 91 ICOs (14
July 2017, [Tok17]) and have already passed VC funding in the blockchain
market[Sun17]. The most used models for token sales are capped sales (i.e.,
selling a fixed number of tokens at a fixed price) and uncapped sales (i.e., selling as
many tokens as possible): these mechanisms offer no price discovery and usually
result in severe underpricing. When the tokens get listed on exchanges, the
high appreciation that they display are evidence of the underpricing experienced
during the ICO sale. For example, the following table lists the recent ICOs of
projects which have not yet released working products but show a very high
appreciation (19/7/2017, [STA17]):
Name Appreciation(%) ICO Date ICO Price Curr. Price
Ark +4525.68% 11/07/16 $0.010 $0.460
Golem +2447.49% 11/11/16 $0.010 $0.267
Aeternity Phase I +1130.92% 04/03/17 $0.043 $0.526
Melonport +736.14% 02/15/17 $5.800 $48.496
Gnosis +666.14% 04/24/17 $25.510 $195.441
SingularDTV +631.24% 10/05/16 $0.015 $0.110
Quantum Ledger +466.65% 05/01/17 $0.077 $0.436
adToken +275.87% 06/26/17 $0.009 $0.033
Mysterium +260.29% 05/30/17 $0.176 $0.635
Humaniq +247.71% 04/06/17 $0.039 $0.137
Aragon +121.76% 05/17/17 $0.917 $2.033
iEx.ec +115.19% 04/19/17 $0.178 $0.383
ChronoBank +91.03% 12/15/16 $7.604 $14.527
EOS +79.83% 06/26/17 $0.925 $1.663
TaaS +77.09% 03/27/17 $1.000 $1.771
VOISE +50.46% 06/05/17 $0.867 $1.305
The case of Gnosis requires special mention: although the ICO was conducted
using a Dutch auction[Lis16], it also suffered from the same underpricing that
is also found on previous IPO auctions and that is usually attributed to the
winner’s curse and the lack of truthfulness of the used mechanisms.
The confusion in the ICO market has spurned a quest for optimal token sale
mechanisms[But17, Mag17], a search that ends with the present mechanism that
offers:
• truthful price discovery of the market valuation of the project
• solving the winner’s curse of the auction
• the high volatility of ICOs gets priced into the deal: the issuer raises more
funding based on the volatility and the bidders will be able to buy more
tokens in the future at a low strike price
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2 Related literature
Investors in ICOs often don’t hold financial securities that give them ownership
rights on the cash-flows of the projects: unlike the traditional paradigm separating
the financial side from the product/market side of the firm, investments in ICOs
are directly integrated with the real side of the firm, that is, the demand structure
for their digital services. Although the general ideas contained in previous
literature applying mechanism design on crowdfunding or IPOs are right and
could be useful on the ICO setting, their models and proofs are unuseable since
there are many significant differences, as explained in this section.
2.1 Crowdfunding Literature
Previous crowdfunding literature[Cha15, BOP15, KLZ15, BLS12, EH16] is based
on the following assumptions that can’t be found on an ICO token sale:
• The entrepreneur has pricing power, ex-ante and post: in an ICO token
sale, the entrepreneur has limited pricing power, especially after the token
sale because the price fluctuates.
• Entrepreneurs are able to differentiate between informed/uninformed in-
vestors, high/low-value investors: in an ICO token sale, the entrepreneur
can’t discriminate between the buyers.
• Entrepreneurs can control the number of produced units: in some ICO
token sales, the number is fixed.
• During a crowdfunding, the entrepreneur can charge higher prices than
the post-crowdfunding market price: in an ICO token sale, the token is
usually sold at a lower price.
• A crowdfunding sells a future product, ICOs sell a token, usually a right-
of-use to a future digital service.
Nonetheless, there are important parallels between ICO and crowdfunding:
• Both ask for an all-or-nothing contribution to start the project, setting a
minimum contribution price to start the project.
• Both enable to test the demand for the product/digital service, that is,
they allow to adapt production to market demand.
2.2 IPO Literature
Previous IPO literature[BF04, BBR02, BF08, DW03, Mal05, PS09] is based on
the following assumptions that can’t be found on an ICO token sale:
• Shares represent a fraction of a real business with cashflows, valuable assets
and voting rights: in an ICO token sale, the business may not yet exist
and tokens usually represent a right-of-use to a digital service.
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• Bookbuilding is the usual method to price an IPO: in an ICO token sale,
capped/uncapped sales are the most used method. Auctions are almost
never used on IPOs/ICOs.
• A third party, an underwriter, handles the IPO: in an ICO token sale, the
entrepreneur manages the whole process.
• The underwriter can discriminate between institutional and retail investors:
in an ICO token sale, the entrepreneur can’t discriminate between the
buyers.
• The mechanisms/allocation rules proposed in the literate use direct alloca-
tion with full preference elicitation: in an ICO token sale, capped/uncapped
sales are the usual method.
2.3 Previous IPOs/ICOs
A number of previous experiences provide guidance to the design of an optimal
mechanism for ICOs:
• Previous Dutch-auction IPOs: much has been written about the failure
of Google’s IPO[Cho05, TL08, Ana05] to properly price the auction, a
disadvantage common to other Dutch-auction IPOs[RR12, DW03].
• Previous warrant auctions: JP Morgan Chase and Capital One Financial
raising funds[Wil09] based on the high volatility due to the financial crisis
while sharing the upside with the bidders as they recover.
• Previous ICO using an auction: Gnosis[Lis16] displayed underpricing[But17].
Several papers have documented the empirical superiority of auction-like mecha-
nisms ([DW03, DDW10, Van03, KSW99]). Experimental comparatives of IPO
mechanisms[BV11, BFC02] demonstrate the optimality of specially designed
auctions for IPOs (i.e., the Ausubel’s auction[AC98, Aus02, Aus04]): nonetheless,
the Ausubel’s auction[Aus04] has never been tried in the IPO environment and
it’s the ascending counterpart of the auction used in this paper (see section 3.2.2).
3 Optimal ICO Design
In this section, a model defining an ICO is introduced, followed by detailed
descriptions of the auction and the design of the hybrid security of callable
tokens (i.e., a token packaged with callable warrants).
3.1 ICO Model
Entrepreneur. Consider an entrepreneur that needs capital investment of
C > 0 to develop a digital service/product that will be used at some marginal
cost mc ∈ [0, 1).
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Initial Coin Offering (ICO). Let c be the total number of bidders and
denote a specific consumer by the index i ∈ N = {1, . . . , c}; every bidder has a
binary valuation of the service, vi = 1 or vi = 0. Let v = (v1, . . . , vc) ∈ V =
{0, 1}c be the c-dimensional vector of the valuation profile of the bidders and
pi (v) denote its corresponding probability. The probability that b bidders value
the product is
Pr (b) =
∑
pi (v){
v :
∑
i∈N vi = b
}
Since mc < 1, b can be interpreted as the potential demand for the entrepreneur’s
service: its randomness expresses the demand uncertainty.
Entrepreneurship without demand uncertainty. Consider perfect
knowledge of the project’s future revenue, pr: it’s socially optimal to invest if
the project’s revenue covers the cost of production C + prmc, that is
pr ≥ c∗ = C
1−mc
In this case, the ex-ante expected aggregate surplus is
S∗ =
c∑
pr=dc∗e
Pr (pr) [(1−mc) pr − C]
If the entrepreneur raises the funds, investing in the project and selling the
results would be the optimal strategy: therefore, a credit market will lend the C
at zero interest rate in perfect foresight of the entrepreneur’s plan.
Entrepreneurship with demand uncertainty. In case pr is not known,
it’s optimal to set p = 1 and it would be optimal to invest with positive profits
Π =
(
c∑
pr=0
Pr (pr) (1−mc) pr
)
− C ≥ 0
Under demand uncertainty, the entrepreneur invests with positive (negative)
profits Π ≥ 0 (resp. Π < 0) and this may imply overinvestment (underinvest-
ment) because the entrepreneur executes the project when it turns out that
pr < c
∗ (resp. pr < c∗).
ICO Crowdfunding. An entrepreneur announces an “all-or-nothing crowd-
funding” defined by a pair (t, T ): a minimum token value t for b bidders (i.e.,
a bidder could contribute multiple tokens as different bidders), so that if the
total collected pledges P = bt are greater than T , P > T , the entrepreneur
receives all the pledged funding to produce the digital service; but if P < T , the
entrepreneur collects no funding from the bidders.
An all-or-nothing crowdfunding scheme (t, T ) with t ∈ (0, 1] yields the
entrepreneur the expected profit
Πc (t, T ) =
c∑
pr=dT/pe
Pr{pr} [(t−mc) pr − C]
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Profit is maximized with a token level t = 1 and target level T = c∗, the
entrepreneur extracting the maximum aggregate surplus S∗, thus yielding an
efficient outcome: it implements the first best in dominant strategies and respects
ex-post participation constraints.
3.2 Dutch Auctions
3.2.1 General Results
Dutch-auction have been used in some IPOs[RR12] and ICOs[Lis16] due to the
following properties:
• In theory, strategically equivalent to a first-price sealed-bid auction, al-
though not in practice[CRS82, LRBC+99, KK08].
• Using a Dutch auction, the market-clearing price is found.
• Speculators do not make profits in first-price/Dutch auctions[GT05]
• If the numbers of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue
than a first-price auction[Mie13]
• The most efficient and largest revenue outcome occurs when bidders are
not provided information on either group size or units remaining[BGP16]
• At fast clock speeds, revenue in the Dutch auction is significantly lower
than in the sealed bid auction. When the clock is sufficiently slow, however,
revenue in the Dutch auction is higher than the revenue in the sealed bid
auction[KK08]
The limited use of Dutch auctions in IPOs despite their potential for more
fully pricing the issue is due to low underwriter compensation[RR12]: in French
markets, there is a smaller degree of underpricing using auctioned IPOs than
traditional IPOs[DW03].
Unfortunately, they also present the following undesirable properties:
• IPOs using Dutch auctions experience an underpricing effect, although in
smaller magnitudes that in traditional IPOs[RR12]
• Dutch auctions are not incentive compatible, that is, truthful bidding is
not an efficient strategy. Some later works introduce variants of the Dutch
auction that are incentive-compatible[MP08, AE13].
3.2.2 Multi-Unit Clinching Vickrey-Dutch auction
The simple multi-unit Clinching Vickrey-Dutch auction[MP08] is a modern
extension of the traditional Dutch auction for multiple homogeneous goods,
featuring truthful bidding in an ex-post Nash equilibrium and terminating
with an ex-post efficient allocation. It assumes a private value setting, where
each bidder knows his own valuation function and its does not depend on
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the valuations or allocations of other bidders. And although the auction is
discriminatory (i.e., winning bidders pay different prices according to their own
bids), it maintains a single price for the tokens in each iteration, allowing their
listing on cryptocurrencies exchanges; actually, discriminatory prices protect
less-informed investors because when they bid, they obtain exactly the quantities
they demand at the desired price.
This auction is also iterative, taking bids from buyers in each iteration and
avoiding the revelation of unnecessary private valuation information through price
discovery. Iterative auctions ease the valuation problem faced by bidders, often
costly and time-consuming: price discovery guides bidders in deciding how to
invest effort in refining their beliefs about their private valuations. Additionally,
unnecessary preference elicitation from losing bidders is completely avoided since
it’s a descending auction.
Definition 1. The maximal demand given the marginal price of a unit, qt, is:
Di
(
qt
)
=

0 , if vi (1)− vi (0) < qt
max j
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}
s.t. vi (j)− vi (j − 1) ≥ qt , otherwise
Definition 2. The residual demand without buyer i is the amount of the supply
that is allocated to buyer i in the main economy that is also demanded (in aggre-
gate) by other buyers and is defined as r−i (qt) = min
(
xi,
∑
j 6=i
[
Dj (q
t)− xj
])
for all iterations t ≥ tm, in which tm is the first iteration in which ∑i∈B xti ≥ n.
For iterations t < tm, define r−i (qt) = 0 for all i ∈ B.
Definition 3. The simple Clinching Vickrey Dutch auction is an iterative
procedure with the following steps:
(S0) Start from a high price q0. Set t := 0. Set the total number of units
clinched by buyers, (c1, . . . , cm) to zero. Set the total payments of buyers,
(s1, . . . , sm) to zero.
(S1) In iteration t of the auction with price qt:
(S1.1) Collect maximal demand Di (qt) of every buyer i at price qt. Impose
Di (q
t) ≥ Di
(
qt−1
)
for every buyer for all t > 0.
(S1.2) If
∑
i∈B Di (q
t) < n then ci = Di (qt) for all i ∈ B. Set qt+1 := qt−1,
t := t+ 1, and repeat from Step (S1.1).
(S1.3) If
∑
i∈B Di (q
t) ≥ n and ∑i∈B Di (qt) < n, then set tm := t and
set c to be any sequential allocation.
(S1.4) Set si := si + qt ∗
(
r−i (qt)− r−i
(
qt−1
))
for all i ∈ B.
(S1.5) If r−i (qt) = ci for all i ∈ B or qt = 0, then go to Step (S2). Else,
set qt+1 := qt − 1, t := t+ 1 and repeat from Step (S1.1).
(S2) Final allocation is (c1, . . . , cm) and the final payment vector is (s1, . . . , sm).
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Theorem 4. Truthful bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy in the
simple Clinching Vickrey Dutch auction under the activity rule and the auction
is ex-post efficient in the homogeneous items Non-Increasing Marginal Valuation
environment.
Proof. See [MP08].
3.2.3 Bidding Language
Let vi (j) denote the value of the bidder i for j units of the item. Assume
vi (0) = 0 for every bidder and vi (j) ≥ 0 for every unit 1 ≤ j < n and bidder i.
The valuations of each bidder must respect that only Non-Increasing Marginal
Values (NIMV) are accepted, that is,
vi (j)− vi (j − 1) ≥ vi (j + 1)− vi (j)
for every bidder i and every unit 1 ≤ j < n.
For example, the following is a valid bidding valuation matrix[MP08]:
j 1 2 3 4
v1 (j) 7 9 10 10
v2 (j) 8 13 15 15
v3 (j) 4 8 10 10
In case the number of units is higher, j = 1.000.000, and the bidders are
willing to bid for 100.000 units at 10 monetary units each, they could express
that bid in the following ways:
j 1 2 . . . 99.999 100.000 . . . 1.000.000
v1 (j) 10 20 j · 10 999.990 1.000.000 1.000.000 1.000.000
v2 (j) 1 2 j 999.990 1.000.000 1.000.000 1.000.000
v3 (j) 1 2 j · 8 999.990 1.000.000 1.000.000 1.000.000
Note how each bidder express their preferences in different ways, even if
sharing the same valuation: bidder 1 always bids their truthful valuation for
every token; bidder 2 is not interested in acquiring a low amount of tokens,
only a number of tokens around 100.000 units; and bidder 3 is also interested
in acquiring 100.000 tokens at 10 monetary units, but a lot lower than 100.000
units is also desired. All the bidders are not willing to bid for more than 100.000
units, so they maintain their valuations constant until reaching the total number
of units.
3.3 Callable Tokens
As shown in the Introduction, there is evidence in the ICO market of the
manifestation of underpricing as in IPOs: the potential presence of better-
informed investors than others entails that investors with less information end
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up with a smaller (larger) allocation of shares when the issue is underpriced
(overpriced)[Roc86]. Therefore, investors with less information require a lower
subscription price to start with.
Definition 5. Warrant. Financial derivative that confers the right, but not
the obligation, to buy or sell a security at a certain price (exercise price or strike
price) before expiration: an American warrant can be exercised at any time on
or before the expiration date, while European warrants can only be exercised on
the expiration date.
To minimize the costs of the winner’s curse, we focus on the design of the
security that minimizes the sensitivity to information asymmetries of the different
investors, irrespective of the mechanisms being used (i.e., compatible with the
multi-unit Clinching Vickrey Dutch auction). Risk-averse entrepreneurs can
signal the high quality of their project when outcomes are risky by including
warrants[CF99]: they value their risky high-state payoffs less than investors
when they want to diversify their position, thus they could use warrants that pay
in high-state payoffs to signal the quality of their project because it’s cheaper
than underpricing[GH89]. This is conceptually similar to commitments to buy
back debt or equity that allow to provide signaling and to finance valuable
projects[CG89, BK87], or to the optimal financing of projects with callable
convertible bonds in the presence of adverse selection[CY11].
Definition 6. Callable warrant. A warrant where the issuer has the right to
call the warrant during a certain period.
Riskier projects in down markets can lower the cost of ICOs by combining
tokens and warrants together: when the information from better-informed
investors is about the downside risk of the project, investors with less information
are less disadvantaged combining tokens and warrants together, reducing the
cost of doing an ICO and the negative effects of the winner’s curse. Moreover,
the winner’s curse can be fully eliminated for projects that have a sizeable
growth potential even in down markets by making the warrants callable, yielding
the first-best outcome[CGY10]: if the potential success and profitability of the
project in down markets is sufficiently large, the callability of the tokens allow
the dynamic creation of a security whose ultimate payoff is insensitive to the
initially held private information of informed investors.
Definition 7. Callable token. A token packaged with callable warrants that
confer the right to convert them into tokens.
A token with warrants entitles the tokenholder to convert the warrants into
tokens of the issuer. On the other hand, in order to cap the unlimited upside
potential of the warrant, the warrant indenture usually includes a clause where
the issuer can call back the warrant at a predetermined call price. Upon calling,
the tokenholder either chooses to receive the cash amount equivalent to the call
price or to convert into tokens (this is direct, cashless conversion). For these two
rights, the convertible feature is the right conferred to the tokenholder while the
callable feature is the right held by the token issuer.
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For the issuer, warrants are an optimal form to raise funding: since volatility
is an important component of warrant pricing, and there is much volatility of
token issues and the token market in general, the price of the warrants will be
high and thus the entrepreneur is raising a large amount of investment based on
said high volatility. The use of warrants also justifies that the issuer must hold a
large percentage of tokens[But17] to satisfy the future conversion/recall of tokens:
unlike warrants on shares, there won’t be dilution when converted/recalled, just
transferred from the issuer’s token pool.
3.3.1 U.S. Securities Laws
Any utility token would be transformed into a security whenever packaged by
warrants because warrants or any asset packaged with warrants are securities
according to the Howey test[Cou46]: offering securities to US citizens in an
ICO requires registration with the SEC according to its latest report on the
DAO[SC17a]; other countries may follow with similar or more restrictive regula-
tions (e.g., China’s ICO ban[Zha17], Hong Kong’s statement[SC17b]). As the
requirements for registration are complex and costly, many ICOs are not being
offered to US citizens.
Any ICO token sale must then consider the trade-off between selling to US
Citizens, or offering packaged warrants and risk losing 20-30% capital that is
typically raised from US citizens, that is,
Value of warrants > 20%− 30% raised capital
After the token sale, warrants may become detachable from utility tokens
to list them on non-US exchanges, while the utility tokens are listed on US
exchanges: this prevents them from being banned from listing or being delisted
from American exchanges[Sha17].
4 Implementation
The simple Clinching Vickrey-Dutch auction (see Definition 3) is implemented
as pseudo-code on Appendix A: although it’s a very efficient algorithm, to run it
on Ethereum would be prohibitively expensive and slow; additionally, to prevent
signaling/collusion most information must be hidden except the prices.
The following is a timing experiment of a Python implementation of the
simple Clinching Vickrey-Dutch auction, varying the number of bidders while
maintaining fixed the number of tokens to be auctioned (70000) and the final
price (2).
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Additionally, the next figure shows another timing experiment, this time
varying the number of tokens to be auctioned while maintaining fixed the
number of bidders (1000) and the final price (2).
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4.1 Web implementation
A PHP/AJAX implementation of the web interface will be open-sourced at
https://github.com/Calctopia-OpenSource. Its bidding page is as follows:
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And its payment page is as follows:
12
References
[AC98] Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton. Auctioning securities, 1998. http:
//ausubel.com/auction-papers/98wp-auctioning-securities.pdf.
[AE13] Tommy Andersson and Albin Erlanson. Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auc-
tions. Working Papers 2012:17, Lund University, Department of Economics, 2013.
http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/WP12_17.pdf.
[Ana05] Anita Indira Anand. Is the Dutch auction IPO a good idea. Stan. JL Bus.
& Fin., 11:233, 2005. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Anita_Anand/
publication/228218169_Is_the_Dutch_Auction_IPO_a_Good_Idea/links/
00b4952176b18caef3000000/Is-the-Dutch-Auction-IPO-a-Good-Idea.pdf.
[Aus02] Lawrence M. Ausubel. Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets.
Center for financial institutions working papers, Wharton School Center for
Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania, 2002. https://core.ac.uk/
download/pdf/6649749.pdf.
[Aus04] Lawrence M. Ausubel. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects.
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 94(5), 2004. http://ausubel.com/auction-
papers/efficient-ascending-auction-aer.pdf.
[BBR02] Bruno Biais, Peter Bossaerts, and Jean-Charles Rochet. An Optimal IPO Mecha-
nism, 2002. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2695955.
[BF04] Moez Bennouri and Sonia Falconieri. The Optimal Design of IPOs: Price vs.
Quantity Discrimination, 2004. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=491002.
[BF08] Moez Bennouri and Sonia Falconieri. The Optimality of Uniform Pricing in IPOs:
An Optimal Auction Approach, 2008. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1289175.
[BFC02] Bruno Biais and Anne Marie Faugeron-Crouzet. IPO Auctions: English,
Dutch,... French, and Internet. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 11(1):9–
36, 2002. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042-9573%
2801%2990319-5.
[BGP16] Joy Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, and David Porter. Information Effects in Uniform
Price Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions. Southern Economic Journal, 83(1):126–145,
2016. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/soej.12145/full.
[BK87] Michael Brennan and Alan Kraus. Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Infor-
mation. Journal of Finance, 42(5):1225–43, 1987. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04363.x/full.
[BLS12] Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert, and Armin Schwienbacher. Crowdfunding:
Tapping the Right Crowd, 2012. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1578175.
[BOP15] Paul Belleflamme, Nessrine Omrani, and Martin Peitz. The Economics of
Crowdfunding Platforms, 2015. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2585611.
[But17] Vitalik Buterin. Analyzing Token Sale Models, 2017. http://vitalik.ca/
general/2017/06/09/sales.html.
[BV11] Stefano Bonini and Olena Voloshyna. A, B or C? Experimental Tests of IPO
Mechanisms, 2011. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
972208.
[CF99] Thomas Chemmanur and Paolo Fulghieri. A Theory of the Going-
Public Decision. Review of Financial Studies, 12(2):249–79, 1999.
https://www2.bc.edu/thomas-chemmanur/phdfincorp/MF891%20papers/
Chemmanur%20and%20Fulghieri%20RFS%201999.pdf.
13
[CG89] George M Constantinides and Bruce D Grundy. Optimal Investment with Stock
Repurchase and Financing as Signals. The Review of Financial Studies, 2(4):445–
465, 1989. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2962064.
[CGY10] Archishman Chakraborty, Simon Gervais, and Bilge Yilmaz. Security Design
in Initial Public Offerings. Review of Finance, 15(2):327–357, 2010. https://
faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~sgervais/Research/Papers/WinnersCurse.RoF.pdf.
[Cha15] Jen-Wen Chang. The Economics of Crowdfunding, 2015. https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827354.
[Cho05] Eugene Choo. Going Dutch: The Google IPO. Berkeley Technology Law Journal,
pages 405–441, 2005. http://www.btlj.org/data/articles2015/vol20/20_1_
AR/20-berkeley-tech-l-j-0405-0442.pdf.
[Cou46] United States Supreme Court. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
v. W. J. HOWEY CO. 1946. http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/
328/293.html.
[CRS82] James C Cox, Bruce Roberson, and Vernon L Smith. Theory and behavior
of single object auctions. 1982. http://www.excen.gsu.edu/jccox/research/
SingleObjectAuctions.pdf.
[CY11] Archishman Chakraborty and Bilge Yilmaz. Adverse Selection and Convertible
Bonds. Review of Economic Studies, 78(1):148–175, 2011. http://www.jstor.
org/stable/23015851.
[DDW10] François Degeorge, François Derrien, and Kent Womack. Auctioned IPOs: The
US evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 98(2):177–194, 2010. https:
//pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1096383/2009-08S.pdf.
[DW03] François Derrien and Kent Womack. Auctions vs. Bookbuilding and the Control
of Underpricing in Hot IPO Markets. Review of Financial Studies, 16(1):31–
61, 2003. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.322.
2150&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
[EH16] Matthew Ellman and Sjaak Hurkens. Optimal Crowdfunding Design, 2016.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2507457.
[GH89] Mark Grinblatt and Chuan Yang Hwang. Signalling and the Pricing of New
Issues. Journal of Finance, 44(2):393–420, 1989. https://www.jstor.org/stable/
2328596.
[GT05] Rod Garratt and Thomas Tröger. Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale,
2005. https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13506/1/42.pdf.
[KK08] Elena Katok and Anthony Kwasnica. Time is money: The effect of clock speed
on sellers revenue in Dutch auctions. Experimental Economics, 11(4):344–357,
2008. http://www.personal.psy.edu/amk17/TimeIsMoney_onlineversion.pdf.
[KLZ15] Praveen Kumar, Nisan Langberg, and David Zvilichovsky. (Crowd)funding Innova-
tion, 2015. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2600923.
[KSW99] Shmuel Kandel, Oded Sarig, and Avi Wohl. The Demand for Stocks: An Analysis
of IPO Auctions. Review of Financial Studies, 12(2):227–47, 1999. http://
finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~sarig/sarigo/demand.pdf.
[Lis16] Matt Liston. Introducing the Gnosis Token Launch, 2016. https://blog.gnosis.
pm/introducing-the-gnosis-token-launch-3cc4cffb5098.
[LRBC+99] David Lucking-Reiley, Ann Bell, Jim Cox, Rachel Croson, Ron Harstad,
Elton Hinshaw, John List, and Preston Mcafee. Using Field Experi-
ments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the In-
ternet. Magic on the Internet. American Economic Review, 89:1063–
1080, 1999. http://www.davidreiley.com/FieldExperimentsCourse/papers/
FullReadingList/LR-RevenueEquivalence.pdf.
14
[Mag17] WINGS Magazine. A Gnosis Dutch Auction for All? Coming to the WINGS Smart
Contract Library, 2017. https://blog.wings.ai/a-gnosis-dutch-auction-for-
all-in-the-wings-smart-contract-library-92b7b698fa9a.
[Mal05] Alexey Malakhov. The Role of Uninformed Investors in an Optimal IPO Mecha-
nism, 2005. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687167.
[Mie13] Paavo Miettinen. Information acquisition during a Dutch auction. Journal of
Economic Theory, 148(3):1213–1225, 2013. https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/
bitstream/handle/123456789/7609/170045.pdf.
[MP08] Debasis Mishra and David C. Parkes. Multi-Item Vickrey-Dutch Auctions, 2008.
http://www.isid.ac.in/~dmishra/doc/vda.pdf.
[PS09] Pegaret Pichler and Alex Stomper. Primary Market Design: Mechanisms And
When-Issued Markets, 2009. web.mit.edu/astomper/www/papers/primary.pdf.
[Roc86] Kevin Rock. Why new issues are underpriced. Journal of Financial Economics,
15(1-2):187–212, 1986. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
0304405X86900541.
[RR12] Mary Robinson and Richard Robinson. Dutch-auction IPOs: institutional
development and underpricing performance. Journal of Economics and Fi-
nance, 36(3):521–554, 2012. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/
s12197-010-9166-3.pdf.
[SC17a] Securities and Exchange Commission. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO. 2017. https://www.sec.
gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
[SC17b] Securities and Futures Commission. Statement on Initial Coin Of-
ferings, 2017. http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=17PR117.
[Sha17] ShapeShift. ShapeShift and Tokens as Securities, 2017. https://info.shapeshift.
io/blog/2017/08/17/shapeshift-and-tokens-securities.
[STA17] ICO STATS. ROI Since ICO, 2017. https://icostats.com/roi-since-ico.
[Sun17] Alex Sunnarborg. ICO Investments Pass VC Funding in Blockchain Market
First, 2017. https://www.coindesk.com/ico-investments-pass-vc-funding-
in-blockchain-market-first/.
[TL08] Andreas Trauten and Thomas Langer. Why the Google IPO Might Stay Exotic-
An Experimental Analysis of Offering Mechanisms. 2008. http://www.efmaefm.
org/0EFMSYMPOSIUM/2008-Oxford/papers/Andreas%20Trauten.pdf.
[Tok17] TokenData. Introducing TokenData.io, 2017. https://medium.com/
blockchannel/introducing-tokendata-io-dcd26d9fbc1e.
[Van03] Sigrid Vandemaele. Choice of Selling Mechanism at the IPO: the Case of the
French Second Market. European Financial Management, 9(4):435–455, 2003.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-036X.00231/abstract.
[Wil09] Linus Wilson. The Biggest Warrant Auction in US History. 2009. https:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1521335.
[Zha17] Wolfie Zhao. China’s ICO Ban: A Full Translation of Regulator Remarks,
2017. https://www.coindesk.com/chinas-ico-ban-a-full-translation-of-
regulator-remarks/.
15
A Auction Implementation
// parameters
n = 4; // number of units
m = 3; // number of buyers
max_t = 9; // starting high price
q[max_t+2]; q[0] = max_t+1;
v[n][m] = 0; // marginal values; note that v_i(0) = 0 for all i
v[0][0] = 0; v[1][0] = 7; v[2][0] = 9; v[3][0] = 10; v[4][0] = 10;
v[0][1] = 0; v[1][1] = 8; v[2][1] =13; v[3][1] = 15; v[4][1] = 15;
v[0][2] = 0; v[1][2] = 4; v[2][2] = 8; v[3][2] = 10; v[4][2] = 10;
//arrays and variables
d[m] = 0; // demand
d_previous[m] = 0; // copy of previous demand
c[m] = 0; // units clinched
r[m] = 0; // residual demand
r_previous[m] = 0; // copy of previous residual demand
s[m] = 0; // payments to buyers
old_sum_demands = 0;
sum_demands = 0;
t_m = 0;
seqEconomyCalculated = false;
for (t = 0; t < max_t+1; t++) {
if (t>0) // save a copy of previous demand
d_previous.copyFrom(d);
if (seqEconomyCalculated) // save a copy of previous residual demand
r_previous.copyFrom(r);
// (S1.1) calculate maximal demand for step t
for (int i = 0; i < m; i++) {
if ((v[1][i] - v[0][i]) < q[t]) {
d[i] = 0;
} else {
int max_j = 0;
for (int j = 1; j < n; j++)
if (v[j][i] - v[j-1][i] >= q[t])
if (j > max_j)
max_j = j;
d[i] = max_j;
}
}
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// (S1.2)
old_sum_demands = sum_demands;
sum_demands = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < m ; i++)
sum_demands += d[i];
if (sum_demands < n) {
for (int i = 0; i < m ; i++)
c[i] = d[i];
q[t+1] = q[t] - 1;
continue; // goto (S1.1)
}
//(S1.3) -> CE of the main economy
if (sum_demands >= n && old_sum_demands < n) {
t_m = t; // now residual demands can be calculated
if (!seqEconomyCalculated) { // set c_i to be any sequential allocation
int sum_dprevious = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < m; i++) {
c[i] = d_previous[i]; sum_dprevious += d_previous;
}
if (sum_dprevious < n) {
int toBeAssigned = n - d_previous;
bool everyoneClinched = False;
while (toBeAssigned > 0) {
if (!everyoneClinched) {
for (int i = 0; i < m; i++) {
if (c[i] == 0) {
if (toBeAssigned > d[i]) {
c[i] += d[i]; toBeAssigned -= d[i];
} else {
c[i] += toBeAssigned; toBeAssigned = 0;
}
}
}everyoneClinched = True;
}
int randBuyer = rand(0, m); int demanded = d[randBuyer];
if (c[randBuyer] < demanded)
if (toBeAssigned > demanded) {
c[randBuyer] += demanded; toBeAssigned -= demanded;
} else {
c[randBuyer] += toBeAssigned; toBeAssigned = 0;
}
}
}seqEconomyCalculated = true;
}
}
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// calculate residual demand
if (t >= t_m) {
for (int i = 0; i < m; i++) {
int sumDemands = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < m; j++) {
if (i != j) {
sumDemands += d[j] - c[j];
}
}
if (c[i] < sumDemands)
r[i] = c[i];
else
r[i] = sumDemands;
}
}
//(S1.4) calculate payments
for (int i = 0; i < m; i++) {
s[i] = s[i] + (q[t] * (r[i] - r_previous[i]));
}
//(S1.5)
bool allEqual = true;
for (int i = 0; i < m; i++) {
if (r_i != c[i]) {
allEqual = false;
break;
}
}
if (allEqual)
break;
if (q[t] == 0)
break;
q[t+1] = q[t] - 1;
}
// final allocation in c[m], final payment vector in s[m]
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